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Abstract:	
Elsewhere	I	argue	that	the	legal	concept	of	property	was	created	in	the	image	of	money	in	the	late	
Roman	Republic.	Since	then,	the	division	of	property	and	contract	has	been	an	underlying	structure	
of	Western	law.	The	paper	argues	that	a	main	way	of	structuring	financial	corporate	power,	especially	
money	market	funds	(MMFs),	is	a	propertization	of	contractual	claims.	Propertization	here	means	to	
grant	property	rights	to	shareholders	who	are	almost	reduced	to	functionless	debenture	holders	and	
thus	supposed	to	have	only	contractual	claims.	The	paper	argues	that	this	propertization	has	led	to	
the	rise	of	 financial	 corporate	power,	especially	MMFs	and	their	money‐creation	mechanism.	The	
paper	also	explores	how	the	propertization	of	MMF	shares	contributed	to	generating	the	financial	
crisis	of	2008,	and	it	ends	by	briefly	discussing	a	possible	MMF	reform	policy.	
Key	words:	Property,	propertization,	finance,	corporate	power,	money	market	funds,	financial	crisis,	
money,	credit,	contract,	shares,	repurchase	agreements	
 
 
apital	 is,	 as	 Jonathan	 Nitzan	 and	 Shimshon	 Bichler	 (2009)	 argue,	 “a	 symbolic	
quantification	 of	 power,	 representing	 the	 organized	 power	 of	 dominant	 capital	
groups	to	reshape	their	society.”	This	paper	argues	that	a	crucial	way	of	structuring	
the	organized	power	of	financial	corporations	is	a	propertization	of	contractual	claims.	This	
way	 of	 structuring	 power—the	 mixture	 of	 two	 disparate	 rights,	 property	 rights	 and	
contractual	 rights—has	not	been	examined	by	scholars,	even	by	scholars	who	argue	 that	
capital	is	a	symbolic	quantification	of	power.	This	paper	aims	at	filling	this	missing	and,	by	
doing	so,	contributing	to	the	theory	of	“capital	as	power.”	
C
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Property	 is	 a	 classical	 notion	 that	 social	 science	has	used	 to	 explain	 the	essence	of	
capitalism.	For	example,	classical	writers,	such	as	Karl	Marx	and	Max	Weber,	argued	that	the	
nature	 of	 the	 transition	 from	 feudalism	 to	 capitalism	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 rise	 of	
absolute	private	property.	However,	this	classical	notion	disappears	in	the	literature	on	the	
global	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2008	 and	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	 financial	 corporations.	 This	
disappearance	is	unfortunate	because	it	makes	the	writings	of	the	classical	writers	no	longer	
relevant	to	the	current	crisis	and	to	the	current	financial	corporate	power.	
Property	and	finance	have	been,	this	paper	argues,	strongly	intertwined.	Elsewhere	I	
(Kim	2014b)	argues	that	the	concept	of	property	was	created	in	the	image	of	money.	This	
mirroring	happened	in	the	late	Roman	Republic,	where	the	new	concept	of	property	was	first	
settled	at	 law	and	money	became	a	predominant	medium	 for	 social	 relations.	 In	modern	
times,	the	situation	has	become	the	other	way	around.	Modern	money	is	created,	as	I	(Kim	
2014b)	elsewhere	argues,	when	credit	becomes	a	money‐like	instrument	by	mirroring	the	
image	of	property,	that	is,	when	property	rights	are	granted	to	creditors.	I	call	this	granting	
the	propertization	of	contractual	claims.	That	money‐creation	mechanism	differs	from	that	
of	previous	money	economy.	Previous	money	economies	 could	extend	 the	money	supply	
only	 by	 mining	 precious	 metals	 or	 debasing	 coinage.	 In	 modern	 times,	 by	 contrast,	 by	
granting	creditors	property	rights,	credit	can	be	transformed	to	money.		
Recently,	some	scholars	use	the	term	propertization	to	describe	a	social	phenomenon	
wherein	what	is	originally	not	property	becomes	property.	This	term	is	most	often	used	for	
common	 natural	 resources	 or	 intellectual	 abilities	 such	 as	 ideas	 and	 knowledge.	 These	
resources	 and	 abilities	 are	 originally	 not	 property	 but	 should	 be	 commonly	 available	 to	
everybody	 according	 to	 the	 social	 rules	 of	 distribution.	 But	 when	 someone	 is	 granted	
exclusive	 rights	 over	 the	 use,	 disposal,	 and	 transfer	 of	 the	 resources	 and	 abilities,	 they	
become	property.	This	is	called	propertization.	The	term	propertization	is	used	in	this	paper	
in	a	similar	sense:	what	is	not	originally	property	becomes	property.	However,	its	use	here	
has	a	difference.	The	propertization	of	contractual	claims	does	not	totally	change	contracts	
into	 property	 but	makes	 them	 Janus‐faced	 hybrids	 of	 the	 two	 legal	 rights	 (property	 and	
contractual	rights)	that	constantly	change	their	faces	to	enjoy	the	benefits	and	reduce	the	
costs	of	both	rights.	
Scholars	also	use	the	term	commodification	to	describe	a	social	phenomenon	wherein	
what	is	originally	not	produced	to	be	sold	becomes	a	commodity.	The	theory	of	capital	as	
power	 also	 considers	 the	 concept	 of	 commodification	 seriously	 and	 argue	 that	 “without	
commodification,	there	can	be	no	capitalization”	(Nitzan	and	Bichler	2009,	p.	307).	It	is	true	
that	without	market	where	capitalist	power	is	commodified,	there	would	be	no	capital.	But	
this	commodification	is	only	one	aspect	of	capital:	Nitzan	and	Bichler	(2009,	p.	18,	my	italics)	
still	say	that	“capitalist	power	is	commodified,	structured	and	restructured.”	Still	it	should	be	
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explained	 not	 only	 that	 how	 capitalist	 power	 is	 commodified	 but	 also	 that	 how	 it	 is	
structured	and	restructured.	I	believe	that	the	concept	of	propertization	contributes	to	the	
latter	explanation.			
I	 elsewhere	 (Kim	 2011)	 examined	 how	 modern	 banking	 and	 its	 money‐creation	
mechanism	originated	in	the	late	seventeenth	century	in	England.	To	do	so,	I	used	the	legal	
term	trusts	instead	of	propertization.	But	these	two	terms	imply	the	same	process	through	
which	creditors	are	granted	property	rights,	thereby	transforming	their	credit	into	money.	
In	this	paper	I	extend	this	previous	research	of	mine	to	explain	how	the	propertization	of	
contractual	 claims	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 rising	 and	 structuring	 of	 corporate	 power,	
especially	money	market	 funds	 (hereafter,	MMFs)	 and	 their	money‐creation	mechanism.	
Shareholders	 in	 the	 present	 form	 of	 business	 corporations,	 including	 MMFs,	 are	 almost	
reduced	to	functionless	debenture	holders	with	limited	responsibility.	That	is,	their	rights	
and	responsibilities	are	those	of	creditors	in	their	economic	substance.	Nonetheless,	the	law	
grants	them	the	opposite,	property	rights.	This	granting	is	a	“propertization.”	In	this	paper	I	
extend	 this	 concept	 of	 propertization	 into	 explaining	 the	 money‐creation	 mechanism	 of	
modern	 financial	 instruments	 including	MMF	shares	and	repos	(repurchase	agreements).	
The	paper	also	argues	that	propertization	occurred	in	MMF	shares	and	repos	was	a	key	cause	
of	the	financial	crisis	of	2008.	
MMFs	are	a	key	element	of	shadow	banking,	where	the	financial	crisis	of	2008	occurred.	
Shadow	 banking	 refers	 to	 the	 bank‐like	 financial	 activities	 conducted	 by	 unregulated	 or	
lightly	regulated	institutions	outside	of	the	traditional	banking	system.	The	other	two	key	
elements	of	shadow	banking	are	securitization	and	repos	(Gorton	&	Metric	2010),	which	will	
be	explained	later.	MMFs	are	open‐ended	mutual	funds	that	are	registered	under	Rule	2a‐7	
of	 the	 Investment	 Company	 Act	 of	 1940	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 MMFs	 have	 rarely	 been	
discussed	in	the	literature	on	the	2008	crisis	because	many	scholars	have	focused	too	much	
on	 securitization	 and	 subprime	 mortgages.	 However,	 as	 a	 few	 scholars	 have	 correctly	
noticed,	 MMFs	 played	 a	 decisive	 role	 in	 creating	 the	 crisis	 (Gorton	 &	Metric	 2010)	 and	
transmitted	it	to	Western	Europe	(Baba,	Robert,	&	Ramaswamy	2009).	
The	 intertwined	 relationship	 between	 finance	 and	 property	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	
rethink	the	conventional	dichotomy	of	 law	and	finance.	The	literature	on	law	and	finance	
considers	law	and	finance	to	influence	each	other,	but	it	treats	them	as	separate	spheres	that	
do	not	constitute	each	other’s	nature.	According	to	this	conventional	dichotomy,	the	role	of	
the	 law	 is	 at	most	 to	 provide	 a	 good	 regulatory	 legal	 environment	 to	 facilitate	 financial	
interactions.	This	conventional	view	is	opposed	to	the	institutionalist	perspective,	according	
to	which	institutions,	including	the	institution	of	law,	constitute	the	very	nature	of	economic	
phenomena	(Pistor	2013).	This	paper	uses	this	institutionalist	perspective	and	identifies	the	
current	 legal	 structure	 and	 decisions	 that	 have	 determined	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 shares,	
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including	MMF	shares.	By	doing	so,	it	overcomes	the	conventional	dichotomy	between	law	
and	finance.	
Western	 law	 has	 Roman	 origins	 and	 is	 structured	 by	 the	 Roman	 legal	 division	 of	
property	 and	 contract.	 The	 paper	 explains	 how	 this	 Roman	 legal	 structure	 became	 the	
foundation	on	which	the	nature	of	shares,	including	MMF	shares,	was	established.	It	argues	
that	MMF	shares	violate	the	traditional	Roman	legal	division	because	the	propertization	was	
regarded	as	illegal	from	the	standpoint	of	the	Roman	legal	principle.	But	at	the	same	time,	
MMF	shares	grow	out	of	the	legal	division.	If	property	rights	were	not	devised	separately	
from	contractual	rights	in	the	late	Roman	Republic,	society	could	not	grant	property	rights	
to	 contractual	 claims.	This	 argument	 allows	us	 to	 approach	 the	 issue	 of	 financial	 reform	
differently	from	the	current	discourse	on	the	subject.	The	current	discourse	never	considers	
the	necessity	of	reforming	(investment)	company	legislation	itself,	focusing	instead	mostly	
on	 how	 to	 externally	 regulate	 the	 greedy	 and	 ill‐behaved	 finance	 sector	 by	 adding	more	
regulatory	 schemes	 and	 governmental	 intervention.	 This	 paper	 briefly	 discusses	 in	 the	
conclusion	how	to	 reform	(investment)	 company	 law	or	 the	structure	of	 the	 law	 itself	 in	
order	to	create	a	just,	stable,	and	sustainable	financial	system.	
This	 paper	 begins	 by	 examining	 how	 property	 rights	 originated	 in	 the	 late	 Roman	
Republic	 and	 how	 these	 rights	 were	 considered	 to	 be	 fundamentally	 different	 from	
contractual	rights	by	traditional	Roman	law.	The	paper	then	explores	how	the	law	in	modern	
times	 has	 come	 to	 grant	 the	 privileges	 of	 property	 to	 its	 opposite,	 contractual	 rights,	 in	
shares,	 including	MMF	 shares.	 Then	 it	 discusses	 how	 this	 propertization	 of	MMF	 shares	
played	a	decisive	role	in	creating	the	financial	crisis	of	2008.	The	paper	ends	by	discussing	
financial	reform	policy	from	a	legal	perspective.	
Property	Rights	versus	Contractual	Rights	
	
The	concept	of	property	has	haunted	Western	law	for	2,000	years.	Property	is	legally	
defined	as	rights	in	rem	(rights	in	things),	in	contrast	to	contracts,	which	are	defined	as	rights	
in	personam	(rights	in	persons).	This	definition	of	property	as	a	relation	between	person	and	
thing	 has	 a	 metaphysical	 implication.	 It	 implies	 that	 property	 rights	 are	 natural	 rights	
regardless	of	whether	other	people	have	agreed	to	them,	in	contrast	to	contractual	rights,	
which	are	considered	to	be	created	by	an	agreement	between	persons.	This	metaphysical	
conception	of	property	is,	as	Orlando	Patterson	has	argued	(1982,	p.	32),	a	fiction,	because	
property	is,	in	reality,	a	relation	between	ourselves	and	everyone	else.	If	a	person	can	exert	
her	absolute	power	over	her	possessions,	she	can	do	so	because	everyone	else	refrains	from	
interfering	with	them	and	allows	her	to	treat	them	in	any	way	she	likes	(Graeber	2011,	p.	
200).		
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This	metaphysically	fictional	concept	of	property	was	invented	as	a	legal	category	for	
the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 late	 Roman	 Republic,	 and	 before	 the	 time	 the	 Romans	 considered	
property	 a	 set	 of	 relationships	 between	 persons,	 more	 or	 less	 like	 rights	 in	 personam	
(Patterson	1982,	p.	31).	The	origin	of	the	new	conception	of	rights	in	rem	has	been	rarely	
discussed	by	scholars	except	Patterson	(1982).	According	to	Patterson,	the	Roman	needed	a	
new	concept	of	property	that	allowed	them	to	distinguish	slaves	from	other	persons,	when	
slaves	became	one	of	the	most	sources	of	wealth	and	objects	of	property.	Thus,	the	Romans	
invented	a	new	concept	that	imitated	the	relationship	between	master	and	slave,	where	the	
slave	was	conceived	of	as	“above	all	a	res	(thing),	the	only	human	res”	(Patterson	1982,	p.	
32).		
His	reasoning	sounds	correct	because	the	image	of	rights	in	rem	fits	well	for	the	image	
of	slaves.	As	David	Graeber	(2011,	pp.	168‐9)	describes,	the	image	of	slaves	is	the	death	of	a	
person,	and	this	death	is	social	one	that	occurs	when	a	person	is	forcedly	ripped	from	her	
context	and	from	all	the	social	relationship	that	make	her	a	human	being.	Analogically,	rights	
in	rem	 are	such	a	power	 is	 to	rip	out	a	 thing	 from	all	 social	 relationship	with	others	and	
thereby	 allow	 an	owner	 to	 exert	 absolute	 power	over	 the	 thing	without	 agreement	with	
others.	For	example,	if	land	becomes	the	object	of	absolute	individual	property,	it	should	be	
ripped	 from	 its	 social	 relationship.	 But	 this	 is	metaphysically	 impossible	 because	 land	 is	
hardly	 owned	 and	 cultivated	 by	 “an”	 individual.	 Land	was	 usually	 possessed	 by	 families	
rather	than	individuals,	and	it	was	cultivated	by	many	people	for	generations.	Land	has	often	
been	owned	by	various	people	simultaneously.	And	its	rights	of	use	and	cultivation	are	often	
separated	from	its	legal	ownership,	and	these	two	rights	can	belong	to	different	persons.	But,	
land	should	be	ripped	from	these	social	context	and	relationship	if	land	would	become	an	
object	of	property.	In	fact,	this	becoming	historically	entailed	violence:	the	legal	enclosure	of	
land	 in	early	modern	 times	entailed	violence	against	peasants.	This	violence	seems	 to	be	
similar	 to	 the	 violence	 that	 occurs	 when	 a	 slave	 is	 ripped	 from	 her	 social	 context	 and	
relationship.	
I	(Kim	2014b)	offers	another	interpretation	of	the	invention	of	rights	in	rem.	I	argue	
that	the	“thing”	in	the	minds	of	the	Romans	was	not	only	slaves	but	also	money.	I	suggest	two	
reasoning	why	money	is	a	good	candidate	for	the	object	from	which	rights	in	rem	are	derived.	
First,	by	comparing	another	candidate,	land,	I	explain	why	money	is	a	more	perfect	object	of	
individual	 absolute	 rights.	 Second,	 I	 explain	 a	 social	 context	 in	 which	 money	 had	 been	
essential	to	the	everyday	life	of	Romans.	Otherwise,	the	Romans	would	not	project	the	image	
of	money	onto	the	new	legal	concept.	In	fact,	the	new	idea	of	property	appeared	in	the	late	
Roman	Republic	not	only	when	hundreds	of	thousands	of	captured	slaves	were	pouring	into	
Italy,	but	also	when	plundered	precious	metals,	such	as	gold,	silver,	and	bronze,	were	also	
pouring	into	Italy.	These	precious	metals	plundered	by	Roman	soldiers	were	coined	by	the	
captured	slaves	and	changed	the	Roman	Republic	 into	a	genuine	money	economy.	Money	
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was	coined	in	various	denominations	so	that	it	can	be	used	to	buy	commodities	of	various	
prices.	In	particular,	large	quantities	of	money	of	small	denominations	should	be	coined,	so	
that	ordinary	people	can	use	it	as	the	main	means	of	procuring	products	of	everyday	life.	
Bronze	coinage	in	the	Roman	Republic	had	such	a	small	denomination,	and	it	was	coined	in	
extraordinarily	large	quantities	because	the	army	under	the	Republic	was	originally	paid	in	
bronze	(Crawford	1970,	p.	47‐48).	After	bronze,	silver	coinage	was	introduced,	and,	by	end	
of	the	Republic	period,	gold	coinage	was	being	produced	regularly.	In	the	late	period	of	the	
Republic,	 when	 the	 concept	 of	 rights	 in	 rem	 was	 created,	 money	 of	 small	 and	 big	
denominations	became	the	dominant	medium	of	social	relations.	
I	(Kim	2014b)	then	argue	that	the	image	the	Romans	found	in	coined	money	was	that	
of	the	lordship	of	a	king	or	God.	Money	can	endow	its	possessor	with	the	ability	to	cancel	any	
ongoing	moral	obligations	to	others—that	is,	to	be	totally	independent	of	them.	This	godlike	
or	king‐like	image	of	money	seems	to	have	been	one	reason	why	Emperor	Tiberius	declared	
it	 “a	capital	offence	 to	 take	a	coin	with	 the	 image	of	Augustus	 into	a	brothel	or	 lavatory”	
(Crawford	1970,	 p.	 47).	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 image	of	 a	king	or	 god	was	 realized	 in	 the	new	
concept	of	property.	Rights	in	rem	is	absolute	power	over	a	thing	regardless	of	whether	other	
people	agree	or	not,	and	it	is	the	power	to	ignore	any	ongoing	moral	obligations	to	others—
that	is,	to	be	totally	independent	of	them.	This	power	can	only	be	possessed	by	a	king	or	god	
(Graeber	2011,	p.	205).	
The	godlike	ability	to	cancel	and	finalize	any	ongoing	moral	obligations	to	others	is,	in	
fact,	realized	in	money’s	function	of	finalizing	debt	obligations.	This	finality	fundamentally	
differentiates	money	from	credit.	Both	money	and	credit	can	function	as	media	of	exchange	
and	be	denominated	by	the	same	unit	of	account.	Nonetheless,	because	of	its	association	with	
finality,	the	concept	of	money	is	the	opposite	of	the	concept	of	credit.	The	transfer	of	a	credit	
instrument	 creates	 a	 creditor‐debtor	 relation	 in	which	 debt	 obligation	 is	 imposed	 to	 the	
transferor.	By	contrast,	money	is	anything	that	is	generally	acceptable	in	the	final	settlement	
of	creditor‐debtor	relations,	and	by	this	final	settlement	the	transferor	becomes	free	from	
debt	obligation.	Later,	this	paper	examines	how	this	finality,	in	whose	image	the	concept	of	
property	was	created,	allows	propertization	to	transform	credit	into	money	in	capitalism.	
Propertization	is	the	process	of	granting	the	image	of	finality	to	credit	and	by	doing	so	of	
transforming	credit	into	money.	
How	this	function	of	finality	was	given	to	money	historically?	Graeber	(2011)	offers	an	
explanation.	In	primitive	communal	societies,	according	to	him,	there	was	no	idea	of	cold‐
blooded	calculative	debt,	and	thus	the	modern	idea	that	money	can	finally	settle	debt	did	not	
exist	 either.	 We	 don’t	 know	 precisely	 when	 and	 how	 calculative	 interest‐bearing	 debts	
originated,	 because	 they	predate	writing	 (Graeber	2011,	 p.	 64).	 Also,	we	don’t	 know	 the	
precise	historical	origin	of	money	whose	social	role	is	to	finally	settle	such	debts.	But	some	
anthropologists	 find	 those	 two	 existed	 in	 ancient	 Mesopotamia,	 but	 the	 way	 how	 they	
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worked	was	quite	different	from	what	we	find	nowadays.	Interest‐bearing	debts	in	ancient	
Mesopotamia	began	in	commercial	loans	but	later	developed	also	in	consumer	loans.	Money	
was	usually	stockpiled	in	temples	or	palaces,	and	merchants	usually	used	credit	instruments,	
rather	than	money,	for	their	trade.	Commercial	loans	did	not	create	serious	social	problems	
because	these	loans	were	productive,	that	is,	because	they	were	invested	to	trade	that	would	
be	expected	 to	produce	 surplus.	But	 consumer	 loans—usury	 in	 the	 classical	 sense	of	 the	
term—often	 threatened	 to	 rip	 society	 apart	 (Graeber	 2011,	 p.	 65),	 because	 these	 were	
unproductive	and	could	not	expect	to	produce	surplus.	They	usually	loaned	to	the	peasantry	
who	urgently	needed	food	because	of	a	bad	harvest.	As	consumers	loans	developed,	large	
proportions	of	the	peasantry	fell	into	debt	peonage	and	lose	their	land	to	creditors.	The	way	
how	 the	 society	 solved	 such	 a	 debt	 crisis	 in	 consumer	 loans	was	 “clean	 slate”	 by	which	
Sumerian	 and	 Babylonian	 kings	 periodically	 announced	 general	 amnesties:	 the	 debt	
cancellation	of	consumer	loans	and	the	return	of	land	to	the	peasantry	(Graeber	2011,	p.	65).		
However,	the	social	role	of	money	changed	significantly	when	coinage	was	invented	
around	 the	 sixth	 century	 B.C.	 (Graeber	 2011).	 It	 was	 invented	 to	 solve	 debt	 crises	 that	
occurred	in	consumer	loans.	Roman	coinage	in	ancient	Rome	was	a	typical	example.	Debt	
crises	in	Rome	took	a	form	of	conflict	between	the	aristocracy	and	the	poor.	To	prevent	the	
debt	peonage	of	poor	peasants	to	aristocrats	and	to	maintain	a	free	peasantry,	Roman	society	
chose	the	military	option	of	distributing	loot	plundered	from	other	societies.	In	the	earlier,	
ancient	 credit	 economy	 like	 ancient	 Mesopotamia,	 gold,	 silver,	 and	 bronze	 had	 been	
stockpiled	in	temples.	But	now	they	were	plundered	by	Roman	soldiers,	minted	by	slaves	
captured	in	war,	and	distributed	to	soldiers	and	the	population	on	a	massive	scale	(Graeber	
2011,	 pp.	 228‐229).	 Plundered	money	 could	 allow	 population	 to	 ease	 their	 urgent	 debt	
obligation.	
In	addition	to	the	general	military	option	of	distributing	coins,	coins	were	also	used	
directly	when	a	debt	 crisis	occurred.	For	 example,	 in	33	A.D.,	when	 the	moneylenders	of	
Rome	attempted	to	call	in	all	debts,	debtors	were	threatened	with	having	to	sell	off	their	land	
in	a	rapidly	falling	market.	To	solve	the	debt	crisis,	Emperor	Tiberius	provided	the	debtors	
with	an	interest‐free	loan	of	one	hundred	million	sestertii	(Crawford	1970,	46).	Money	was	
also	the	direct	solution	to	the	debt	crisis	of	the	80s	B.C.	Debt	reform	by	L.	Valerius	Flaccus	
allowed	debtors	to	pay	off	their	debts	at	a	rate	of	one	as	on	the	silver	sestertius	(Crawford	
1970,	 45).	 A	 sestertius	 was	 previously	 valued	 at	 four	 asses.	 Interestingly,	 according	 to	
historian	 Michael	 Crawford,	 such	 political	 interventions	 did	 not	 occur	 when	 currency	
shortages	occurred	in	63,	49,	and	44	B.C.	The	lack	of	intervention	in	these	instances	implies	
that	coinage	was	a	political	measure	to	solve	debt	crises	rather	than	an	economic	measure	
to	encourage	commerce.	Even	though	coinage	in	Rome	played	an	important	role	as	a	means	
of	 exchange,	 this	 economic	 function	 was	 not	 its	 primary	 purpose.	 It	 was	 instead	 “an	
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accidental	consequence	of	the	existence	of	coinage,	not	the	reason	for	it”	(Crawford	1970,	
46).	
In	 inventing	 the	 absolute	 power	 of	 property	 owners	 in	 the	 image	 of	 the	 finality	 of	
money,	 the	 traditional	 Roman	 law	 considered	 property	 rights	 to	 be	 different	 from	
contractual	rights.	And	in	the	Roman	law,	property	rights	and	contractual	rights	cannot	be	
mixed	 with	 them.	 For	 example,	 under	 Roman	 law,	 a	 depositor’s	 rights	 are	 considered	
different	from	a	creditor’s	rights.	The	rights	of	a	depositor	are,	on	the	one	hand,	rights	in	rem,	
and	 thus	 a	 depositor	 retains	 legal	 ownership	 over	 the	 deposited	 property.	 A	 depositary	
should	keep	deposits	safe,	maintain	a	100	percent	reserve,	and	honour	depositors’	requests	
to	withdraw	deposits	at	any	time	on	demand,	and	depositors	are	charged	a	safekeeping	fee.	
On	the	other	hand,	in	a	loan	transaction	the	rights	of	a	creditor	are	rights	in	personam.	The	
creditor	 cedes	 legal	 ownership	 of	 property	 to	 a	 debtor	 during	 a	 specified	 period	 and,	 in	
exchange,	obtains	a	debt	claim	that	goes	against	a	person.	The	creditor	can	oblige	the	debtor	
to	fulfil	an	obligation	to	repay	the	principal	and	the	interest.		
Table	1,	Deposits	versus	Loans	in	Roman	Law	
	 Legal	Category	 Ownership	 Purpose	 Temporality	 Reserve	
Deposits	 Rights	in	rem	 Not	transferred	 Safekeeping	
Withdraw	on	
demand	 100%	
Loans	 Rights	 in	
personam	 Transferred	
Interest‐
gaining	
Fixed	
specific	
period	
No	reserve	
	
These	two	inherently	disparate	transactions	are	mixed	when	depositaries	attempt	to	
loan	 deposited	 funds	 for	 profit	 while	 depositors	 enjoy	 the	 rights	 to	 withdraw	 and	 use	
deposits	at	any	time	on	demand.	This	mixture	is	the	essence	of	modern	commercial	banking.	
This	 was	 systematically	 institutionalized	 first	 by	 London	 goldsmith‐bankers	 in	 late	
seventeenth‐century	 England.	 This	 beginning	 of	 modern	 commercial	 banking	 has	 been	
examined	 extensively	 by	 myself	 elsewhere	 (2011).	 What	 goldsmith‐bankers	
institutionalized	was	the	propertization	of	a	contract.	These	goldsmiths	made	a	loan	contract	
with	 their	 depositors.	 In	 this	 contract,	 the	 depositors	 allowed	 the	 goldsmiths	 to	 loan	
deposited	funds	to	third	parties	in	the	bankers’	name	for	profit.	Here,	the	goldsmith	became	
debtors,	 and	 the	 depositors	 became	 creditors.	 But	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 contract	 was	
propertized	because	the	depositors	were	still	granted	property	rights	to	withdraw	and	use	
deposits	at	any	time	on	demand.	
In	 fact,	 this	 attempt	 to	 propertize	 contracts	 was	 considered	 embezzlement	 in	 the	
Roman	law	tradition.	In	this	tradition,	an	honest	depositary	of	even	fungible	things,	such	as	
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money	or	grain,	had	to	keep	one	hundred	percent	tantundem	of	deposits	(Huerta	de	Soto	
2009).	 In	 the	 Middle	 Ages,	 private	 banks	 in	 Continent	 Europe	 also	 abused	 the	 belief	 of	
depositors	by	loaning	deposited	funds	to	other	customers.	Governments	on	the	Continent	
established	public	deposit	banks	to	exact	credit	for	public	expenses,	especially	international	
wars.	But	 these	abuses	by	private	and	public	deposit	banks	were	frequently	the	object	of	
public	accusation	due	to	the	Roman	law	heritage	in	Continental	Europe.	In	Catalonia	in	1360,	
for	 example,	 a	 banker	who	 had	 failed	 to	 return	 deposits	 to	 depositors	was	 beheaded	 in	
accordance	with	the	law	(Huerta	de	Soto	2009,	p.	76).	And	Continental	public	deposit	banks	
were	strictly	forbidden	to	loan	deposited	funds	to	private	individuals	(de	Roover	1974,	p.	
228).	
Propertization		
From	the	modern	point	of	view,	the	absolute	power	of	property	owners	under	Roman	
law	 was	 still	 limited	 due	 to	 its	 strict	 division	 of	 rights	 in	 rem	 and	 rights	 in	 personam.	
Shareholders	in	MMFs	likely	think	that	they	deserve	what	they	now	enjoy—including	voting	
rights	at	general	meetings,	redemption	rights	on	demand,	and	limited	liability.	But	from	a	
historical	 legal	perspective,	what	 they	enjoy	 is	an	undeserved	privilege	 that	other	simple	
creditors	or	property	owners	cannot	enjoy.	By	mixing	rights	in	rem	and	rights	in	personam	
cleverly,	the	privilege	allows	shareholders	to	enjoy	the	benefits	and	reduce	the	costs	of	both	
property	 rights	 and	 creditors’	 rights.	 I	 call	 the	 process	 of	 generating	 this	 privilege	 as	
propertization	of	contractual	claims.	
Let	us	examine	how	the	privilege	was	established	historically:	first,	shares	in	ordinary	
companies	and	then	MMF	shares.	This	paper	argues	 that	 this	establishment	was	possible	
because	the	law	treats	shareholders	ambivalently:	it	treats	shareholders’	rights	as	property	
rights	and	at	the	same	time	as	contractual	rights.		
On	the	one	hand,	the	law	has	treated	shareholders	as	the	owners	of	a	company.	For	
example,	the	law	has	granted	shareholders	voting	rights	at	a	general	meeting	to	appoint	and	
dismiss	 directors.	 And	 a	 company	 is	 legally	 bound	 to	 work	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 its	
shareholders.	 These	 property	 rights	 have	 been	 continuously	 granted	 even	 though	
shareholders	no	longer	carry	the	duties	and	responsibilities	of	traditional	owners,	that	 is,	
even	though	they	are	mere	creditors	in	term	of	duties	and	responsibilities.	But	the	property	
rights	enjoyed	by	shareholders	are	not	the	traditional	sense	of	property	rights	because	the	
law	no	longer	treats	shareholders	as	the	owners	of	the	assets	of	a	company	since	the	British	
case	of	Bligh	v.	Brent	in	1837.	Shareholders	cannot	use	the	assets,	cannot	lend	them	out	to	
others,	and	cannot	use	them	as	collateral.	But	the	law	still	treats	shareholders	as	the	owners	
of	the	company,	though	not	of	its	property.1	Shareholders	gives	up	the	immediate	controlling	
                                                            
1 Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Laird Group PLC (2003), UKHL 54 at para 35. 
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rights	over	the	assets	but	instead	exert	controlling	power	at	a	distance	on	the	company,	and	
this	 distant	 controlling	 power	 explains,	 as	 shall	 be	 seen,	 how	 shareholders	 enjoy	 the	
privilege	that	other	simple	creditors	or	property	owners	cannot	enjoy.	
Some	 scholars	might	 disagree	with	my	argument	 that	 shareholders	 enjoy	property	
rights.	And	they	might	argue	that	the	company	cannot	be	owned	because	it	is	not	a	thing	that	
can	be	owned.	Against	this	counterargument,	I	suggest	two	facts	that	they	should	consider.	
First,	 property	 is	 a	 tendency	 to	 transform	what	 is	 essentially	 not	 an	 object	 of	 exclusive	
possession	of	an	individual	or	collective	person	into	property.	As	mentioned,	slave	and	land	
are	essentially	not	property,	but	 the	 law	of	property	 in	Ancient	Rome	and	modern	 times	
forcedly	made	them	into	property.	The	way	of	this	propertization	was,	as	explained	earlier,	
to	make	salve	and	land	“rem	(thing)”	that	can	be	easily	removed	from	their	social	relations	
with	their	family	and	community.	A	corporation	is	essentially	not	a	property	because	it	is	a	
group	of	persons.	Persons	cannot	be	owned	by	other	persons.	If	so,	a	corporation—a	group	
of	persons—would	be	treated	like	slaves.	It	is	what	happens	in	modern	times.	It	is	treated	as	
property.		
How	 to	 substantially	 put	 a	 corporation	 under	 the	 possessive	 power	 of	 dominant	
shareholders	 depends	 on	 the	 concrete	 methods	 of	 corporate	 governance	 as	 well	 as	 on	
political	and	 legal	environment.	The	current	corporate	governance	mechanism	in	the	U.S.	
seems	 to	 allow	 the	 largest	 shareholder	 to	 substantially	 put	 a	 corporation	 under	 her/his	
possessive	 power.	 This	 substantial	 power	 can	 be	 noticed	 if	 we	 compare	 corporate	
governance	with	political	governance.	Different	from	the	politician	representation	of	“one	
person,	one	vote”	rule,	corporate	governance	is	based	on	the	representation	of	“one	share,	
one	vote”	rule.	This	rule	allows	the	rich	largest	shareholder	to	be	able	to	earn	a	substantial	
amount	of	voting	rights	enough	to	monopolistically	controlling	a	corporation.	And	different	
from	the	political	representation	of	the	U.S.	that	does	not	allow	people	to	recall	the	members	
of	the	House	of	representative,	the	dominant	shareholder	has	rights	not	only	to	elect	a	board	
of	directors	but	also	dismiss	them.	These	differences	would	contribute	to	the	fact	that	the	
dismissal	 rate	of	 corporate	CEOs	has	been	much	higher	 than	 that	of	 the	members	of	 the	
House.	In	the	U.S.,	almost	no	members	of	the	House	are	removed	from	office	involuntarily,	
and	 the	House	re‐election	rates	are	between	87	and	98	percent	between	1950	and	2016	
(Murse	2018).	By	contrast,	“CEOs	are	as	likely	to	leave	prematurely	as	to	retire	normally”	
around	2005	in	the	US	(Boaz	2006).	The	high	re‐election	rates	of	the	House	members	do	not	
imply	that	the	members	the	House	have	performed	so	much	better	than	the	CEOs	of	business	
corporation.	Rather,	the	largest	shareholder’s	right	to	dismiss	CEOs	is	effective,	while	voters’	
right	to	dismiss	the	House	members	is	not.	Shareholders’	controlling	right	of	a	corporation	
is	more	substantial	than	voters’	right	to	control	their	political	representatives.	
The	substantial	property	rights	of	the	largest	shareholder	depend	also	on	political	and	
legal	environment.	Before	the	1970s,	managerialism	predominated,	and	political	and	legal	
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environment	emphasized	the	social	roles	of	the	professional	managers	of	corporations	 in	
achieving	full	employment	and	welfare	policy.	In	this	political	environment,	the	power	of	the	
largest	shareholder	was	relatively	inferior	to	the	professional	managers.	And	legal	decisions	
made	in	courts	was	also	favourable	to	the	managers	than	to	the	largest	shareholder.	But	after	
the	 time	when	Neo‐liberalism	become	predominant	 in	 the	 late	 1970s,	 political	 and	 legal	
environment	become	more	favourable	to	shareholders	than	to	professional	managers.	This	
period	is	called	era	of	shareholder	primacy	in	which	the	power	of	the	largest	shareholder	to	
control	a	corporation	became	substantial.	To	sum	up,	we	can	say	that	the	largest	shareholder	
who	 has	 a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 voting	 rights	 enough	 to	monopolistically	 controlling	 a	
corporation	 has	 property	 rights	 on	 the	 corporation.	 The	 corporation	 is	 essentially	 not	
property	but	made	into	it.		
On	the	other	hand,	the	law	has	increasingly	treated	them	as	creditors.	For	example,	
since	Bligh	v.	Brent,	the	law	has	considered	the	legal	and	equitable	ownership	of	capital	to	
be	completely	 transferred	 to	 the	company	 from	shareholders.	This	 legal	decision	 implied	
that	shareholders	were	no	longer	the	owners	of	the	property	of	the	company.	And	via	the	
1855‐62	Companies	 Acts	 the	 law	 granted	 them	 limited	 liability.	Here,	 the	 legal	 status	 of	
shareholders	became	like	that	of	creditors,	who	lose	only	their	loaned	money	when	a	debtor	
goes	 bankrupt.	 This	 creditor’s	 right—limited	 liability—was	 granted	 to	 shareholders,	
according	 to	 Ireland	 (2010),	 not	 because	 of	 the	 demands	 of	 advanced	 technology	 and	
economic	 efficiency,	 but	 because	 of	 a	 political	 demand	 to	 accommodate	 and	 protect	 the	
interest	 of	 rentier	 investors.	 Ireland	 argues	 that	 the	 Industrial	 Revolution	 in	 the	 United	
Kingdom	 at	 that	 time	 did	 not	 need	 limited	 liability	 because	 manufacturing	 was	
predominantly	carried	out	by	ordinary	partnership	(Ireland	2010,	p.	839).		
This	dual	treatment	of	the	individual	members	of	a	corporation	not	only	as	its	owners	
but	 also	 as	 its	 creditors	 is	 a	 strange	 formation	 because	 creditors	 have	 usually	 been	 the	
outsiders	of	a	group.	Members	are	insiders,	and	as	long	as	they	are	the	member‐owners	of	a	
group,	their	responsibilities	and	liabilities	are	unlimited,	as	with	partnerships.	Partners	in	a	
partnership	were	differentiated	from	creditors	under	Roman	law.	A	partner	 is,	as	seen	in	
Table	2,	an	insider	and	a	member‐owner	who	shares	assets,	duties,	responsibilities,	and	risks	
with	other	partners.	Unlike	a	creditor,	a	partner	did	not	transfer	the	ownership	of	his	money	
to	 other	 partners.	 By	 contrast,	 a	 creditor	 is	 an	outsider	who	 has	 limited	 liability	when	 a	
debtor	goes	bankrupt	and	who	has	no	responsibility	for	the	debtor’s	wrongful	behaviour.	
This	 differentiation	 of	 partnerships	 and	 loans	 was	 inherited	 by	 canon	 law	 in	 medieval	
Europe	and	was	received	into	civil	law	and	English	partnership	law	(Ireland	1999,	pp.	35‐
36).	English	partnership	 law	“presumed	that	each	partner	was	an	active	 trader	 in	a	 joint	
concern	[with]	full	power	to	act	as	agent	of	his	fellow	partners”	(Lobban	1996,	pp.	397,	399).		
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Table	2.	Partnership	versus	Loans	in	Roman	Law	
	 Legal	Category	 Ownership	 Assets,	 duties,	responsibilities	 Liability	
Partnership	 Rights	in	rem	 Not	transferred	 Shared	 Unlimited	
Loans	 Rights	 in	
personam	 Transferred	 Not	shared	 Limited	
	
The	 law’s	ambivalent	 treatment	of	 shareholders	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	ambivalent	 legal	
definition	 of	 shares.	 The	most	 popular	 definition	was	 provided	by	 Farwell	 J	 in	Borland’s	
Trustee	v.	Steel	Bros	&	Co	Ltd	in	1901:	
A	 share	 is	 the	 interest	 of	 a	 shareholder	 in	 the	 company	measured	 by	 a	 sum	of	
money,	for	the	purpose	of	liability	in	the	first	place,	and	of	interest	in	the	second,	
but	 also	 consisting	 of	 a	 series	 of	 mutual	 covenants	 entered	 into	 by	 all	 the	
shareholders	 inter	 se	 in	 accordance	with	 [s14	of	 the	Companies	Act	1985].	The	
contract	contained	in	the	articles	of	association	is	one	of	the	original	incidents	of	
the	share.	A	share	is	...	an	interest	measured	by	a	sum	of	money	and	made	up	of	
various	rights	contained	in	the	contract,	including	the	right	to	a	sum	of	money	of	a	
more	or	less	amount.2		
This	 definition	 is	 ambivalent	 because	 it	 contains	 two	 distinct	 rights	 together:	 creditors’	
rights	and	property	rights.	The	words	“the	purpose	of	liability”	imply	creditors’	rights,	but	
the	words	“interest	in	the	company”	imply	property	rights.	In	spite	of	this	ambivalence,	this	
definition	emphasizes	 contractual	 rights.	Against	 this	 emphasis,	 other	 legal	 theorists	 and	
courts	have	emphasized	property	rights.	For	example,	legal	theorist	L.C.B.	Gower	explains	
that	the	above	definition	is	trying	“to	equate	shares	with	right	under	a	contract….	[But]	a	
share	is	something	far	more	than	mere	contractual	rights	in	personam.…	[T]he	share	itself	is	
an	 object	 of	 dominion,	 i.e.	 of	 rights	 in	 rem”	 (Davies	 1997,	 p.	 144).	 And	 recently,	 in	Her	
Majesty’s	 Commissioners	 of	 Inland	 Revenue	 v.	 Laird	 Group	 PLC	 in	 2003,	 Lord	 Millet	
emphasized	the	property	rights	of	shares:		
It	is	customary	to	describe	[a	share]	as	“bundle	of	rights	and	liabilities,”	and	this	is	
probably	 the	 nearest	 that	 one	 can	 get	 to	 its	 character,	 provided	 that	 it	 is	
appreciated	 that	 it	 is	more	 than	 a	 bundle	 of	 contractual	 rights.…	 These	 rights,	
                                                            
2 [1901] I Ch 279, 288. 
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however,	 are	 not	 purely	 personal	 rights.	 They	 confer	 proprietary	 rights	 in	 the	
company	though	not	in	its	property.3	
This	trend	of	containing	the	two	rights	simultaneously	in	shares	but	emphasizing	one	of	the	
two	demonstrates	the	ambivalence	of	legal	theorists	towards	shares.	
The	struggle	to	fit	shares	into	an	existing	legal	category	is	bound	to	fail	because	the	law	
has	granted	shares	what	it	is	unable	to	conceptualize.	The	legal	categories	available	to	legal	
theorists	 and	 courts	 are	 only	 the	 two	 categories—property	 (rights	 in	 rem)	 and	 contract	
(rights	in	personam)—but	they	are	too	distinct	to	allow	a	middle	ground	between	them.	In	
spite	of	the	exclusivity	of	the	two	rights,	the	law	has	historically	granted	shares	both	rights.	
This	situation	that	has	been	applied	to	ordinary	shares	also	applies	to	MMF	shares.	The	
US	 Investment	 Company	 Act	 grants	MMF	 shareholders,	 like	 ordinary	 shareholders,	 both	
creditors’	rights,	such	as	limited	liability,	and	property	rights,	such	as	voting	rights	to	elect	
directors,	approve	changes	to	fundamental	policies	with	respect	to	key	investment	activities,	
and	approve	management	contracts	(Kaplowitz	2014).		
MMF	shares	differ	from	ordinary	shares	largely	in	three	respects.	First,	the	ability	of	
MMFs	to	buy	other	MMFs’	shares	is	legally	limited.	For	example,	it	is	illegal	for	an	MMF	to	
acquire	more	than	3	percent	of	the	outstanding	shares	of	another	MMF	(Kaplowitz	2014,	p.	
121).	Here,	large	shareholders’	power	to	control	other	MMFs	is	legally	limited.	Second,	unlike	
ordinary	shareholders,	MMF	shareholders	redeem	their	shares	on	demand	on	the	same	day,	
by	writing	checks.	In	1977,	Merrill	Lynch	for	the	first	time	introduced	“cash	management	
accounts”	from	which	their	shareholders	could	write	checks	(FCIC	2011,	p.	30).	Lastly,	unlike	
ordinary	shareholders,	MMF	shareholders	are	promised	that	a	share	maintains	a	net	asset	
value	of	$1.	
The	 last	 two	aspects	make	MMF	shares	an	even	more	contradictory	combination	of	
rights	 in	 rem	 and	 rights	 in	 personam,	 because	 they	 cause	 the	 ownership	 of	 the	 money	
invested	in	MMFs	to	be	both	transferred	and	not	transferred	from	shareholders	to	the	fund.	
On	the	one	hand,	ownership	is	not	transferred:	because	MMF	shareholders	can	withdraw	the	
funds	invested	in	the	pool	of	MMFs	at	any	time	on	demand	by	writing	checks,	they	practically	
retain	the	present	availability	and	ownership	of	the	funds.	A	portion	of	the	pool	remains	as	
the	property	of	a	shareholder,	and	because	the	ownership	is	not	transferred	to	MMFs	from	
the	 shareholders,	 the	shareholders	 enjoy	rights	 in	rem,	 and	 the	 relationship	between	 the	
shareholders	and	the	funds	is	an	owner‐representative	relationship.	On	the	other	hand,	the	
ownership	 is	 transferred:	MMFs	 lend	 the	 funds	 at	 their	own	discretion	and	 in	 their	own	
names,	attaining	and	retaining	the	ownership	title	of	the	loans.	Thus,	the	ownership	of	the	
                                                            
3 UKHL 54 at para 35. 
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funds	is	transferred	from	MMF	shareholders	to	MMFs	because	a	person	can	lend	property	in	
his	 or	 her	 name	 only	 when	 he	 or	 she	 has	 ownership	 of	 it.	 As	 long	 as	 the	 ownership	 is	
transferred,	 the	 rights	of	MMF	 shareholders	 are	 rights	 in	personam,	 and	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 shareholders	 and	 MMFs	 is	 a	 creditor‐debtor	 relationship.	 How	 can	 the	
ownership	of	a	thing	be	transferred	and	not	transferred	simultaneously?	This	situation	is	self‐
contradictory,	and	this	self‐contradiction	occurs	because	of	propertization,	that	is,	because	
shareholders	 who	 are	 mere	 creditors	 are	 granted	 rights	 in	 rem,	 the	 rights	 to	 use	 and	
withdraw	funds	at	any	time	by	writing	checks.	
In	MMF	shares,	two	disparate	purposes	coexist—interest	gaining,	which	characterizes	
a	loan	transaction,	and	the	right	to	redeem	an	investment	on	demand,	which	characterizes	a	
deposit	transaction.	Since	the	late	Middle	Ages,	one	justification	for	charging	interest	on	a	
loan	 has	 been	 what	 economics	 today	 calls	 opportunity	 cost.	 Interest	 is	 considered	
compensation	 for	 the	 giving‐up	 of	 the	 present	 availability	 and	 ownership	 of	 funds	 for	 a	
specific	period.	However,	MMF	shares	do	not	entail	an	opportunity	cost	because	they	are	
paid	at	any	time	on	demand.	In	spite	of	this	lack	of	opportunity	cost,	gaining	interest	is	one	
of	the	purposes	of	MMFs.	This	coexistence	is	the	hybrid	between	rights	in	rem	and	rights	in	
personam.	
This	 propertized	 hybridity	 is	 the	money‐creation	mechanism	 of	modern	 finance.	 It	
creates	 a	 double‐ownership	 structure	 in	which	 two	exclusive	owners—shareholders	 and	
MMFs—enjoy	the	present	availability	of	the	same	amount	of	funds.	This	double‐ownership	
is	a	creation	of	an	additional	ownership	title	on	one	and	the	same	amount	of	money.	This	
double	 ownership	 differs	 from	 fragmented	 or	 shared	 ownership.	 While	 in	 fragmented	
ownership	 each	 owner	 has	 exclusive	 ownership	 of	 only	 part	 of	 the	 property,	 in	 double	
ownership	 each	 owner	 has	 exclusive	 ownership	 of	 the	whole	 property.	While	 in	 shared	
ownership	each	owner	cannot	use	or	sell	a	shared	property	without	the	consent	of	other	
owners,	 in	double	ownership	 each	owner	has	 the	 free	 right	 to	use	 and	 sell	 the	 property	
without	the	consent	of	the	other	owners.		
To	 sum	 up,	 the	 hybridity	 of	 shareholders’	 rights	 aims	 to	 enhance	 the	 absolute	
ownership	 of	 property—rights	 in	 rem.	 To	 express	 this	 situation	 in	 Hegelian	 style,	
shareholders	enhance	their	property	rights	far	beyond	the	limit	of	traditional	property	rights	
by	 appropriating	 their	 opposite,	 creditors’	 rights,	 as	 their	 element.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
enhancement	grows	out	of	the	pure	individualism	of	rights	in	rem	but	utilizes	its	opposite:	
rights	in	personam	and	collectivism	(the	legal	personality	of	a	company).		
If	 this	 situation	 is	 described	 the	 other	way	 around,	 the	 enhancement	 can	 be	 called	
propertization.	As	mentioned	before,	shareholders,	including	MMF	shareholders,	are	almost	
reduced	 to	 creditors	 in	 their	 economic	 substance.	 Following	 this	 trend,	 Bligh	 v.	 Brent	
regarded	 shareholders	 as	 creditors	 who	 completely	 transfer	 the	 legal	 and	 equitable	
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ownership	of	capital	to	the	company,	and	the	1855‐62	Companies	Acts	granted	shareholders	
limited	 liability.	Because	 the	 law	began	 to	 treat	 shareholders	as	 creditors,	 it	 should	have	
stopped	 granting	 them	 the	 opposite—property	 rights—if	 it	 had	 wanted	 to	 maintain	
consistency	 in	 the	 legal	 principle	 that	 separates	 the	 two	 legal	 categories—property	 and	
contract.	But	the	law	has	given	up	its	consistency	by	continuing	to	grant	property	rights	as	
well.	In	the	case	of	MMFs,	shareholders	still	enjoy	the	ability	to	finalize	their	creditor‐debtor	
contracts	 freely	 at	 any	 time	 on	 demand	 by	writing	 checks.	 This	 propertization	 creates	 a	
double‐ownership	 scheme,	 a	money‐creation	mechanism.	Here,	propertization	grants	 the	
privileged	finality	of	money,	in	whose	image	the	concept	of	property	was	created,	to	creditor‐
debtor	contracts,	and	by	doing	so	it	transforms	credit	into	money.	
This	propertization	 is	 a	 key	 cause	of	 the	 emergence	of	big	 institutional	 debtors.	By	
offering	 shareholders	 the	 two	 disparate	 benefits	 together—interest	 gathering	 and	
redemption	rights	on	demand—MMFs	can	collect	huge	amounts	of	capital.	Because	most	of	
the	 time	 their	 creditors—shareholders—would	 not	 all	 withdraw	 their	 money	
simultaneously,	a	portion	of	the	debts	remains	in	the	hands	of	MMFs	and	is	transformed	into	
permanent	capital	that	MMFs	do	not	need	to	repay	and	can	use	for	their	own	gain	most	of	
the	time.	
MMF	assets	have	grown	rapidly,	from	less	than	$2	billion	in	1974	to	$11	billion	in	1978,	
to	$76	billion	in	1980,	to	$1	trillion	in	1997,	and	to	nearly	$4	trillion	in	2009	(Fink	2014,	p.	
87).	 This	 rapid	 growth	 has	 been	 possible	 because	MMFs	 have	 offered	 both	 the	demand‐
deposit	 services	 of	 safekeeping	and	 high	 interest	 to	 the	 large	 amounts	 of	 funds,	 often	 in	
billions	of	dollars,	of	institutional	investors	such	as	asset	managers	and	global	corporations.	
Commercial	banks	could	not	match	these	interest	rates	because	an	interest	ceiling	had	been	
imposed	on	their	demand‐deposits	by	Regulation	Q	from	1933	until	2011	(Fink	2014,	p.	86).	
Propertization	&	the	Crisis	
Before	discussing	how	the	propertization	of	MMF	shares	played	a	decisive	role	in	the	
crisis,	we	need	 to	understand	 the	mechanism	of	 “off‐balance‐sheet	 financing,”	where	 the	
financial	crisis	of	2008	occurred.		
This	financing,	which	has	been	popular	for	the	last	few	decades,	began	when	the	supply	
side	of	the	financing,	commercial	banks,	no	longer	held	their	assets,	which	generate	a	stream	
of	income	over	the	long	term,	on	their	balance	sheets.	These	assets	include	mortgage	loans,	
credit‐card	loans,	and	automobile	loans	that	the	banks	offer	to	their	customers.	The	banks	
transfer	the	portfolios	of	these	loans	to	a	trust	company	(a	special‐purpose	conduit),	and	the	
trust	company	slices	the	pool	of	debts	into	different	tranches,	which	it	then	sells	to	investors.	
These	products	are	called	asset‐backed	securities	(ABSs)	and	collateralized	debt	obligations	
(CDOs).	To	raise	funds	to	buy	these	products,	those	conduits	sell	short‐term	asset‐backed	
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commercial	papers	(ABCPs).	These	safe	ABCPs	are	ensured	a	AAA	rating	and	sold	primarily	
to	MMFs.	The	sale	of	these	products	is	usually	brokered	by	broker‐dealers	such	as	Merrill	
Lynch	and	Morgan	Stanley.	This	off‐balance‐sheet	financing	has	become	so	popular	in	part	
because	of	the	banks’	need	to	avoid	the	capital‐regulation	requirement	imposed	by	the	Basel	
I	Accord	(Brunnermeier,	2009,	pp.	80‐81).	However,	the	main	reason	for	its	popularity	is	the	
high	demand	for	securitized	products	from	investment	banking,	especially	from	MMFs	for	
safe,	high‐quality	assets	to	invest	in	(FCIC	2011,	p.	30).	
Before	 the	 2008	 crisis,	 as	 I	 (2014a)	 argues	 elsewhere,	 off‐balance‐sheet	 financing	
looked	safe	 from	standpoint	of	 investors.	For	example,	 large	banks	 typically	promised	 to	
provide	credit	guarantees	to	their	conduits	if	the	conduits	faced	a	default.	And	the	CDOs	sold	
to	the	demand	side	of	off‐balance‐sheet	financing	were	mainly	the	safest	tranches,	and	the	
toxic	waste—the	most	junior	tranche	of	subprime	mortgage	loans—was	often	held	by	the	
issuing	bank	and	was	thus	rarely	injected	into	the	off‐balance‐sheet	financing.	But	investors	
created	a	run	on	MMMFs,	and	these	funds	suddenly	created	a	run	on	the	repo	market.	The	
reason	for	these	runs	cannot	be	explained	entirely	by	the	sub‐prime	mortgage	crisis	because	
“prospective	subprime	losses	were	clearly	not	large	enough	on	their	own	to	account	for	the	
magnitude	of	the	crisis,”	as	Ben	Bernanke	claimed	(quoted	in	FCIC,	2011,	p	27)	
MMFs	are	the	demand	side	of	the	off‐balance‐sheet	financing.	The	crisis	of	2008	began	
within	 the	 demand	 side	 of	 the	 off‐balance‐sheet	 financing,	 when	 investors,	 especially	
institutional	 investors,	 created	 a	 run	on	MMFs	 (Brunnermeier	2009;	Gorton	and	Metrick	
2010).	 Unlike	 other	 mutual	 funds,	 MMFs	 are	 exempted	 by	 the	 Security	 and	 Exchange	
Commission’s	 (SEC)	 “Rule	 2a‐7”	 from	mark‐to‐market,	 so	 that	MMFs	 do	 not	 adjust	 their	
prices	per	share	to	reflect	the	daily	market	value	of	their	assets.	Thus,	MMFs	can	claim	that	
their	assets	are	always	worth	100	cents	on	the	dollar,	even	when	they	are	not.	MMFs	are	also	
open	ended,	making	it	possible	for	their	retail	investors	to	redeem	their	shares	on	demand	
on	the	same	day.	Together	with	the	open‐endedness	of	the	shares,	by	promising	to	maintain	
a	net	asset	value	of	$1	per	share,	MMFs	falsely	lead	their	shareholders	to	believe	that	what	
they	have	kept	in	MMFs	is	cash.4	However,	in	reality	the	cash	that	MMF	shareholders	invest	
in	MMFs	is	loaned	to	third	parties	in	the	name	of	MMFs.	When	the	shareholders	suddenly	
realize	that	their	belief	 is	wrong	and	that	MMFs’	loan	to	their	parties	might	be	in	trouble,	
they	create	a	run	on	MMFs.	On	September	16,	2008,	when	 the	Reserve	Primary	Fund—a	
large	MMF	with	$65	billion	in	assets—announced	that	its	shares	were	worth	only	97	cents,	
it	faced	about	$39.6	billion	in	redemption	requests.	This	event	triggered	bank	runs	on	other	
MMFs	and	resulted	in	the	withdrawal	of	about	$172	billion	in	a	week	(Kacperczyk	&	Schnabl	
                                                            
4	In	 the	 UK,	 this	 false	 belief	 is	written	 into	 the	 law.	 English	 law	 regards	money	market	 deposits	 as	 ‘cash,’	
differentiated	from	financial	instruments	that	include	shares	in	companies	or	bonds.	According	to	the	Financial	
Collateral	Arrangements	(No.	2)	Regulations	2003,	Article	3,	“‘cash’	means	money	in	any	currency,	credited	to	
an	account,	or	a	similar	claim	for	repayment	of	money	and	includes	money	market	deposits	[…].”	
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2010,	p.	41).	MMFs	were	thus	forced	to	sell	their	assets,	such	as	commercial	papers	(CP)	and	
certificates	of	deposits	(CD),	at	fire‐sale	prices,	creating	a	major	liquidity	crisis	among	the	
prime	borrowers	in	the	CP	and	CD	markets.	Such	runs	would	have	been	much	greater,	and	
the	U.S.	financial	system	would	have	collapsed,	had	the	U.S.	Department	of	the	Treasury	not	
promised	temporary	deposit	insurance	covering	the	entire	$3.45	trillion	worth	of	MMMFs	
on	September	19.	
MMFs	also	transmitted	the	crisis	in	the	United	States	to	Western	Europe.	At	that	time,	
MMFs	in	the	US	invested	massively	in	European	banks,	especially	in	certificates	of	deposits	
issued	by	the	banks.	Interestingly,	the	large	part	of	these	purchase	by	MMFs	started	after	
August	2007	because	 they	wanted	 to	 find	safer	 investment	 in	order	 to	be	away	 from	the	
subprime	mortgage	crisis	of	2007.	In	September	2008	when	MMFs	sold	commercial	paper	
and	certificates	of	deposits	at	fire‐sale	prices,	a	major	liquidity	crisis	among	European	banks	
was	created	(Baba,	Robert,	&	Ramaswamy	2009).	This	private‐banking	crisis	of	European	
banks	became	a	sovereign‐debt	crisis	when	European	states	provided	bailout	packages	to	
the	banks.	
The	above‐mentioned	double‐ownership	scheme	of	MMF	shares	is	almost	the	same	as	
that	of	commercial	banks.	In	commercial	banking,	one	amount	of	cash	deposits	creates	two	
cash	balances	of	the	same	amount,	one	for	depositors	and	the	other	for	a	commercial	bank.	
This	 double‐ownership	 scheme	 has	 historically	 created	 financial	 crises,	 exposing	 a	
community	to	a	new	type	of	risk	like	the	risk	in	a	“pass	the	parcel”	game,	in	which	“the	loser	
is	 the	 one	 holding	 the	 parcel	 when	 the	 music	 stops”	 (Kim	 2011).	 When	 depositors	 in	
commercial	banks	suddenly	realize	that	the	banks’	loans	to	third	parties	are	in	trouble,	they	
create	a	run	on	the	banks	in	order	not	to	be	the	loser.	A	similar	form	of	bank	run	happened	
with	 MMFs	 in	 2008.	 This	 run	 happened	 because	 the	 creditor‐like	 shareholders	 had	 a	
property	right,	the	right	to	withdraw	funds	at	any	time	on	demand.	When	the	shareholders	
run	on	MMFs	in	order	not	to	be	the	loser,	they	shift	the	risk	to	others	and	create	the	risk	of	
financial	collapse.	In	this	sense,	as	Gorton	and	Metrick	(2011,	p.	2)	argue,	the	crisis	of	2008	
is	analogous	to	the	banking	panics	of	the	19th	century	that	happened	because	of	bank	runs	in	
the	demand	deposits	of	commercial	banks.	
MMFs	 also	 expanded	 the	 crisis	 by	 contributing	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 another	
propertization,	a	repo.	A	repo	consists	of	two	sales	transactions	in	which	the	seller	(in	our	
example,	a	broker‐dealer)	sells	an	asset	to	the	buyer	(in	our	example,	MMFs)	with	a	promise	
to	 repurchase	 the	 same	 asset	 at	 a	 higher	 price	 in	 the	 future.	 A	 repo	 is	 in	 its	 economic	
substance	a	secured	loan	in	which	a	debtor	pledges	some	asset	as	collateral	for	the	loan.	The	
selling	price	of	the	asset	becomes	the	amount	of	the	loan,	and	the	difference	between	the	
selling	price	and	the	repurchased	price	becomes	interest.	In	2008,	MMFs	made	a	run	on	repo	
markets.	 This	 run	 and	 the	 resultant	 collapse	 of	 repo	 markets	 were	 a	 major	 event	 that	
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generated	a	systemic	crisis	(Gorton	and	Metrick	2010).	MMFs	could	make	these	runs	because	
their	investment	in	repo	markets	was,	as	shall	be	seen,	propertized.		
Interestingly,	 this	propertization	of	repos	was	demanded	by	MMFs.	The	Investment	
Company	Act	 restricted	mutual	 fund	 investment	 in	 entities	 engaged	 in	 securities‐related	
businesses,	 because	 a	 mutual	 fund	 can	 be	 exposed	 to	 the	 risks	 of	 the	 business.	 This	
restriction	should	have	been	applied	to	repos	when	a	broker‐dealer	is	counterparty,	because	
MMFs’	investment	in	repos	is	in	economic	substance	a	loan	and	MMFs	are	therefore	exposed	
to	 the	 risk	 of	 the	 loan.	 But	 the	 US	 SEC	 made	 an	 exception	 for	 repos	 to	 satisfy	 MMFs’	
investment	demand.	The	SEC	did	so	by	regarding	repos	as	a	“purchase”	of	securities	rather	
than	a	“debt”	of	the	broker‐dealer	when	the	purchase	satisfies	certain	conditions	(Kaplowitz	
2014,	pp.	122‐3).	These	conditions	include:	(1)	the	legal	ownership	of	the	collaterals	should	
be	completely	transferred	to	MMFs;	and	(2)	MMFs	should	be	excluded	from	the	Chapter	11	
bankruptcy	process	and	be	permitted	to	withdraw	their	investment	when	the	seller	of	a	repo	
goes	bankrupt	(Kaplowitz	2014,	pp.	122‐3).		
As	shall	be	seen	below,	if	an	investment	satisfies	these	two	conditions,	an	investor	(a	
creditor)	is	granted	property	rights	that	other	simple	creditors	do	not	enjoy.	It	is	a	scheme	
of	propertization.	Repos	can	satisfy	those	two	conditions	because	they	are	structured	as	a	
sale,	 even	 though	 they	 are	 in	 economic	 substance	 a	 secured	 loan.	Unlike	 a	 secured	 loan,	
however,	a	repo	satisfies	the	above	condition	(1).	Because	a	repo	takes	the	form	of	a	sale,	the	
ownership	of	collateral	is	transferred	from	a	debtor	(a	seller)	to	a	creditor	(a	buyer,	MMFs	in	
our	 case)	 in	 repo	 contracts.	 This	 transfer	 does	 not	 occur	 in	 a	 secure‐loan	 contract.	 In	 a	
secure‐loan	contract,	a	debtor	retains	property	rights	in	the	collateral,	and	a	creditor	has	a	
right	to	possess	the	collateral	or	to	sell	it	only	after	the	debtor	breaches	a	payment	obligation.	
In	contrast,	the	creditor	in	a	repo	has	complete	power	and	the	right	to	possess	and	sell	the	
collateral	because	the	ownership	of	collateral	is	completely	transferred	to	the	creditor	(in	
our	 case,	 an	MMF).	The	 creditor	 (buyer)	 is	 only	obliged	 to	 replace	 the	 collateral	with	an	
equivalent	security	by	the	date	of	the	repurchase	contract.		
A	 single	 piece	 of	 collateral	 is	 often	 used	 to	 effect	 settlement	 in	 a	 number	 of	 repo	
contracts	on	the	same	day.	This	further	use	of	collateral	is	called	rehypothecation.	Through	
rehypothecation,	for	example,	a	broker‐dealer	can	leverage	her	initial	capital	twenty	times	
in	 the	 repo	 market	 (Gorton	 and	 Metrick	 2010;	 Singh	 and	 Aitken	 2010).	 Before	 their	
bankruptcies,	Bear	Stearns	and	Lehman	Brothers	had	leverage	ratios	of	over	30:1	(Duffie	
2010,	61).	Money	is	created	here	as	in	commercial	banks’	demand	deposits.	As	mentioned,	
the	selling	price	of	collateral	is	the	amount	of	the	loan	that	is	delivered	to	the	debtor	of	a	repo.	
The	debtor	enjoys	the	ownership	of	the	loan	and	uses	its	present	availability.	But	at	the	same	
time,	its	creditor	takes	the	ownership	of	the	collateral	and	uses	it	for	other	contracts.	It	is	
money	 creation	 because	 the	 creditor	 does	 not	 loan	 any	 money	 to	 a	 debtor	 from	 the	
perspective	of	the	creditor,	even	though	the	debtor	borrows	and	uses	the	money.	This	money	
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creation	happens	because	repos	are	a	scheme	of	propertization,	that	is,	because	the	creditors	
of	repos	are	granted	property	rights	on	collaterals.		
Conditions	(1)	and	(2)	grant	a	repo	buyer	the	property	right	to	freely	withdraw	their	
investment	 when	 the	 seller	 goes	 bankrupt.	 Because	 repos	 are	 loan	 contracts	 in	 their	
economic	substance,	they	should	have	been	subject	to	the	Chapter	11	bankruptcy	process.	
This	bankruptcy	process	is	designed	to	distribute	the	assets	of	a	bankrupt	debtor	as	fairly	as	
possible	 among	 the	 creditors.	 The	 process	 includes	 an	 automatic	 stay,	 which	 prevents	
creditors	 from	 collecting	 a	 debtor’s	 assets	 before	 a	 court	 assesses	 both	 the	 value	 of	 the	
debtor’s	assets	and	 the	 full	 extent	of	 creditors’	 claims.	The	process	also	voids	any	 recent	
payments	made	by	the	firm,	because	payments	made	just	prior	to	bankruptcy	can	favour	one	
creditor	over	others.	This	procedure	 is	called	avoidance.	Thus,	collateral	posted	against	a	
derivative	 contract	 during	 the	 ninety	 days	 before	 declaring	 bankruptcy	 is	 subject	 to	
avoidance.	A	repo,	however,	is	excluded	from	the	Chapter	11	bankruptcy	process	and	is	thus	
not	subject	to	the	requirements	of	an	automatic	stay	and	avoidance	because	repos	legally	
take	the	form	of	a	sale	contract.	This	way,	creditors	can	quickly	withdraw	the	contract	by	
selling	 collaterals	 before	 their	 prices	 collapse,	 even	 when	 a	 debtor	 goes	 bankrupt.	 This	
advantage	 of	 repos	 has	 been	 criticized	 for	 giving	 creditors	 of	 repos	 an	 unfair	 privilege	
because	 other	 creditors	 cannot	 withdraw	 their	 loans	 until	 after	 a	 court	 decision.	 This	
privilege	 is	a	property	right—the	right	of	property	owners	 to	withdraw	their	money	and	
finalize	a	 contract	 regardless	of	 the	agreement	and	consensus	between	parties,	 including	
creditors	and	the	court.	
This	propertization,	which	grants	the	creditors	of	repos	property	rights,	has	led	to	the	
boom	of	the	repo	market	over	the	last	few	decades.	Even	though	there	is	no	official	data,	the	
US	repo	market	exceeded	$10	trillion	in	mid‐2008	(Gorton	and	Metrick	2010).	In	December	
2008,	MMFs	alone	held	$552	billion	in	repos	(Gorton	and	Metrick	2011,	p.	8).	But	a	run	on	
repo	markets	occurred	 in	2008	because	 the	creditors	of	repos	(in	our	case,	MMFs)	could	
enjoy	the	property	right	of	withdrawing	their	investment	quickly	when	debtors	go	bankrupt,	
while	other	creditors	have	to	wait	until	a	court	makes	its	decision.	
To	sum	up,	a	repo	is	a	propertization	of	contractual	claims.	Even	though	the	buyers	in	
repos	are	in	their	economic	substance	merely	creditors	having	rights	in	personam,	they	can	
also	enjoy	rights	in	rem	because	the	repo	is	disguisedly	structured	as	a	sale:	the	law	considers	
a	buyer	of	a	repo	(the	creditor)	to	have	rights	in	rem	on	collateral.	This	propertization	grants	
the	privileged	finality	of	money,	in	whose	image	the	concept	of	property	was	created,	to	a	
creditor‐debtor	contract,	and	by	doing	so	the	creditors	of	repos	finalize	their	creditor‐debtor	
contracts	freely	without	the	above‐mentioned	intervention	of	bankruptcy	courts.	
Propertization	in	repos	would	not	have	been	possible	without	political	support	from	
Congress.	In	1982,	a	US	bankruptcy	court	in	In	re	Lombard‐Wall	ruled	that	a	repo	is	a	secured	
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loan	and	ordered	the	buyer	(creditor)	of	a	repo	to	turn	over	the	collateral	to	the	seller.	This	
court	decision	made	collateral	posted	for	a	repo	subject	to	the	requirement	of	an	automatic	
stay	 during	 the	 bankruptcy	process.	 This	 decision	 aimed	 to	 defeat	 the	 artful	 self‐serving	
attempts	by	lawyers	and	financiers	to	make	loan	transactions	look	like	sale	transactions	in	
order	 to	 avoid	 the	 bankruptcy	 process	 (Schroeder	 1996).	 But	 this	 court’s	 decision	 so	
distressed	the	government,	the	Federal	Reserve,	and	the	financial	community,	which	feared	
that	 it	 would	 impair	 repo	 markets,	 that	 Congress	 attempted	 to	 override	 it	 in	 1984	 by	
amending	 the	 Bankruptcy	 Code	 and	 exempting	 repos	 from	 the	 bankruptcy	 process	
(Schroeder	1996,	p.	1011).	Since	then,	when	the	courts	have	considered	the	nature	of	repos	
for	bankruptcy	purposes,	they	have	determined	them	to	be	sales,	and	to	support	this	decision	
they	 have	 prioritized	 the	 form	 of	 the	 contracts	 over	 their	 substance.5	This	 prioritization	
differs	from	the	early	decisions	of	the	courts	in	United	States	v.	Drickson	(1979)	and	SEC	v.	
Miller	 (1980),	 which	 considered	 the	 economic	 substance	 of	 the	 contract	 when	 they	
addressed	the	nature	of	repos.	But	US	courts	still	consider	the	economic	substance	of	the	
contract	 when	 they	 have	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 taxability	 of	 the	 interest	 income	
received	 by	 the	 creditors	 of	 repos.	 For	 example,	 the	 United	 States	 Supreme	 Court,	 in	
Nebraska	Department	of	Revenue	v.	Loewenstein	 (1994),	 justified	 government	 taxation	of	
interest	 income	by	declaring	that	“It	does	not	matter	that	the	Trusts	and	Seller‐Borrower	
characterize	the	repos	as	sales	and	repurchases,	since	the	substance	and	economic	realities	
of	the	transactions	show	that	the	Trusts	receive	interest	on	cash	they	have	lent	to	the	Seller‐
Borrower.”	It	would	be	interesting	to	research	what	happened	when	Congress	attempted	to	
override	the	legal	reasoning	made	in	In	re	Lombard‐Wall.	A	detailed	story	of	the	relationship	
between	 MMFs,	 the	 SEC,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 the	 government,	 and	 other	 institutional	
investors	at	that	time	would	improve	our	understanding	of	the	political	economy	of	finance	
and	law.	
Conclusion	
The	use	of	the	finality	of	money	in	the	Roman	Republic	and	Empire	was	a	substitute	
for	an	old	solution	 to	debt	crises.	Previously,	 in	Babylonian,	 Sumerian,	and	other	ancient	
civilizations,	consumer	debts,	which	ordinary	people	owed	to	tax	farmers,	were	cancelled	
without	 the	 use	 of	 money.	 They	 were	 simply	 cancelled	 by	 the	 emperor	 in	 a	 periodic	
“redemption”	or	“year	of	jubilation.”	The	difference	from	this	old	solution	was	that	money	
allowed	the	Romans	to	solve	debt	crises	even	when	creditors	were	still	repaid—that	is,	even	
when	 creditors’	 rights	 were	 still	 guaranteed.	 As	 Graeber	 (2011)	 demonstrates,	 coinage	
ultimately	could	not	solve	Roman	debt	crises.	The	supply	of	coinage	based	on	the	imperial	
option	only	mitigated	crises	temporally.	Thus,	by	the	end	of	the	Roman	period,	most	people	
in	the	countryside	had	become	debt	peons	to	rich	landlords	(Graeber	2011,	232).	Since	the	
                                                            
5 For example, see Cohen v. Army Moral Support Fund, 67 B.R. at 598. 
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financial	crisis	of	2008,	enormous	amounts	of	money	have	been	created	in	order	to	bail	out	
private	banks	and	boost	the	money	economy.	However,	if	what	has	been	true	historically	is	
true	 today,	 the	 creation	 and	 injection	 of	 money	 is	 not	 the	 real	 solution.	 It	 will	 merely	
postpone	the	bursting	of	the	capitalist	economy.	A	real	solution	would	be	the	cancelation	of	
the	debt	of	individuals	without	using	money.	
	
Modern	times	began	when	natural‐rights	theorists	resettled	the	concept	of	absolute	
property	rights	on	the	basis	of	Roman	law	around	the	seventeenth	century.	Its	example	was	
John	Locke’s	natural‐right	theory	of	property	that	provided	the	ideological	foundation	for	
the	Glorious	Revolution.	For	him,	property	rights	are	absolute	in	the	sense	that	they	exist	
prior	to	the	establishment	of	social	institutions	or	an	agreement	with	other	people	(Please	
see	Kim	2014a,	pp.	327‐8).	The	current	legal	practice	of	fitting	certain	economic	transactions	
into	two	different	legal	categories,	property	or	contract,	is	definitely	of	Roman	heritage.	In	
this	sense,	our	times	are	an	extension	of	Roman	times,	but	with	an	important	difference:	we	
freely	propertize	contractual	rights	by	granting	the	privileges	of	property	rights	to	creditors.	
That	is,	financiers	are	granted	rights	in	rem	over	credit	claims	and	thereby	create	a	hybrid	of	
property	and	contract.	I	argued	that	this	propertized,	hybrid	ownership	scheme	constitutes	
the	essence	of	MMF	shares	and	the	cause	for	the	current	global	financial	crisis.		
I	 conclude	 this	 paper	 by	 commenting	 on	 a	 possible	 reform	 policy	 of	 the	 current	
financial	system	from	a	new	perspective.	This	comment	is	brief	and	incomplete,	but	it	offers	
a	direction	for	future	research.	The	current	discourse	focuses	on	how	to	externally	regulate	
the	 greedy	 and	 ill‐behaved	 finance	 sector	 by	 adding	 more	 regulatory	 schemes	 and	
governmental	intervention.	This	paper	implies	that	we	should	reform	company	law	or	the	
structure	of	the	law	if	we	want	to	reform	finance	in	a	more	fundamental	way.	One	reform	
policy	would	be	to	prohibit	any	propertization	of	contractual	rights,	that	is,	to	prevent	all	
financial	investors	from	enjoying	both	legal	rights	simultaneously.	In	the	same	vein,	Ireland	
(2010)	offers	a	radical	reform	policy	to	correct	corporate	irresponsibility.	He	argues	that	the	
policy	should	strictly	divide	creditors’	rights	from	property	rights,	that	is,	decouple	limited	
liability	from	control	rights.	The	same	reform	policy	can	be	applied	to	MMF	reform.	MMF	
shareholders	 are	 merely	 functionless	 creditors	 with	 limited	 responsibility.	 The	 reform	
would	involve	no	longer	granting	them	property	rights	in	their	shares,	that	is,	to	abolish	the	
redemption	rights	of	MMF	shareholders	at	par.		
Our	 discussion	 allows	 us	 to	 rethink	 the	 concept	 of	 property	 rights	 (rights	 in	 rem).	
Property	rights	are,	as	mentioned,	a	metaphysical	fiction.	If	so,	the	property	rights	of	MMF	
shareholders	are	a	legal	fiction	as	well.	MMF	shareholders	enjoy	the	property	right	of	being	
able	to	redeem	their	shares	at	any	time	on	demand	at	par.	We	saw	that	this	right	leads	MMF	
shareholders	to	enjoy	enhanced	property	rights,	to	shift	a	risk	to	others,	and	eventually	to	
cause	a	systemic	instability	of	finance	that	negatively	affects	an	indefinite	class	of	persons.	
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This	situation	opens	a	question:	why	should	the	law	support	these	metaphysically	fictional	
rights	that	privilege	a	small	group	of	persons	and	affect	the	world	negatively?		
For	centuries,	social	scientists	have	debated	the	legitimacy	of	property	rights.	Some	
have	 considered	 property	 rights	 to	 be	 natural	 and	 inviolable,	 and	 have	 argued	 that	 they	
should	therefore	be	protected	by	the	state.	Following	this	line	of	reasoning,	property	rights	
have	been	established	at	law.	Others	have	maintained	that	property	rights	are	created	by	an	
agreement	 between	 people	 and	 can	 thus	 be	 redistributed,	 regulated,	 or	 re‐contracted	
through	another	agreement	or	by	the	state	for	the	purpose	of	the	wellbeing	of	society.	This	
paper	attempts	to	contribute	to	the	rediscovery	of	this	classical	discussion	of	property	rights	
as	 something	 directly	 relevant	 to	 the	 current	 global	 crisis,	 as	 something	 central	 to	 our	
understanding	the	cause	of	and	solution	to	the	crisis.	
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